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First and foremost, however, this is a case about a 
young Jamaican woman who one day left her country, 
for the very first time, in order to travel to another 
Caribbean country and, having arrived there, found 
herself in a situation from which, several months later, 
according to Jamaican medical practitioners, she was 
still suffering post-traumatic stress.1 
I.     INTRODUCTION: HASSLE-FREE TRAVEL 
Shanique Myrie, a twenty-two-year-old, left Jamaica on March 
14, 2011, to visit a friend in Barbados.2 Upon arriving in Barbados, she 
was denied entry, subjected to invasive body cavity searches, detained 
overnight in “demeaning and unsanitary conditions” and deported the 
next day.3 She was never allowed to enter Barbados or given a reason 
why she was denied entry and subjected to insults and inhumane 
treatment.4 Alleging violation of her right to freedom of movement 
under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Ms. Myrie filed an 
application at the Caribbean Court of Justice (“CCJ” or “Court”) just 
over a year later. 
Long before Ms. Myrie’s denial of entry, the right to freedom 
of movement has been an aspirational goal in Caribbean regional 
integration. In particular, the notion of “hassle[-]free travel” emerged 
in the Report of the West Indian Commission (“WIC”) entitled “Time 
for Action.”5 The report’s recommendation for implementing hassle-
free travel enthusiastically embodied those hopeful objectives while 
also invoking the practical impediments to Caribbean regional 
integration. Thus, within the Caribbean Community (“CARICOM”)6, 
                                               
 1 Myrie v. Barbados, [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ), ¶ 1. 
 2 Id. ¶ 2. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 WEST INDIAN COMMISSION (“WIC”), TIME FOR ACTION 142 (1993) 
 6 The Caribbean Community (“CARICOM”) is a grouping of twenty 
countries: fifteen Member States and five Associate Members. See CARICOM, 
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intraregional freedom of movement lies at the heart of the challenges 
to regional integration. In concept and function, the topic of free 
movement of people exemplifies the complexities of fully 
implementing Caribbean regional integration.7 As summarized in a 
Green Paper by the Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration: 
Hassle[-]free travel refers to the freedom of 
CARICOM nationals to travel into a[n]d within the 
jurisdiction of any member state without harassment 
or the imposition of impediment. The notion of 
hassle[-]free travel is intended to foster a greater sense 
of community and to encourage greater intra-
CARICOM tourism.8 
Several issues factor into the discussion of this topic within the 
larger context of generating regional unity. First, the freedom of 
movement issue emerged early in the regional integration process as 
an impediment to regional cooperation. Second, the mechanism for 
resolving these issues that could arise with this freedom was ultimately 
established but required implementation. Third, the freedom of 
movement issue, while political, is a highly personal and sensitive 
concern that encapsulates the heart of CARICOM cooperation. Even 
with these issues, regional integration in the Caribbean typically has 
afforded hassle-free travel. Nonetheless, failing to uphold this goal in 
                                               
Member States and Associate Members, https://caricom.org/member-states-and-
associate-members/. 
 7 Mia Mottley, Prime Minister, Barbados, Address at the Opening Ceremony of the 
39th Regular Meeting of the Heads of Government of CARICOM, CARICOM (July 6, 2018), 
https://caricom.org/address-by-the-hon-mia-amor-mottley-q-c-m-p-prime-
minister-of-barbados-at-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-39th-regular-meeting-of-the-
heads-of-government-of-caricom/ (quoting a statement by Errol Barrow, the first 
Prime Minister of Barbados, that “the regional integration movement is a fact of daily 
experience. It is a reality which is lived but which we have not yet been able to 
institutionalise.”). 
 8 Comprehensive Review of Immigration Policy and Proposals for Legislative Reform, 
BARBADOS MINISTRY OF LABOUR & IMMIGRATION, 27 (2009), 
https://barbadosunderground.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/green_paper_on_im
migration_policy.pdf . 
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singular instances can have an enduring, sensational impact on the lives 
of CARICOM citizens as illustrated in Myrie v. Barbados.9 
As the Caribbean region has sought to consolidate the 
hallmarks of regional cooperation, an ongoing political and 
nationalistic battle has emerged between the aspirational language of 
the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (“RTC”)10 and the practical, 
colonial imbued requirements of domestic law. In the midst of these 
tensions are ongoing concerns about national security and crime 
prevention within and among CARICOM nation states. These salient 
issues came together in the original jurisdiction ruling of the CCJ in 
Myrie v. Barbados.11 In this landmark case, the CCJ has revisited a key 
issue of the freedom of movement as part of the Caribbean Single 
Market and Economy (“CSME”). In remedying an essential question 
concerning freedom of movement under the RTC, the CCJ also 
addressed a potentially ruinous flaw12 in the CSME’s implementation.13 
The Court, well aware of its role, stated: 
Given the historic background of this aspect of free 
movement, a background that can be found both in the 
                                               
 9 Myrie, supra note 1. Daniel Turack labeled the CARICOM approach as a 
“qualified freedom of movement”. Daniel C. Turack, Freedom of Movement in the 
Caribbean Community, 11 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 37, 42 (1981). He also stated, 
“The freedom of establishment provisions of the CARICOM Treaty are purposely 
weak and allow the prospective host country the necessary latitude to curtail any 
significant influx of nationals from other CARICOM members.” Id. at 49. 
 10 In 2006, the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas replaced the original treaty 
that was enacted in 1973. See AGREEMENT TO ENABLE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF 
THE REVISED TREATY OF CHAGUARAMAS ESTABLISHING THE CARIBBEAN 
COMMUNITY INCLUDING THE CARICOM SINGLE MARKET AND ECONOMY, 
http://www.commonlii.org/caribbean/other/treaties/CaricomTSer/2006/5.pdf. 
 11 Myrie, supra note 1. 
 12 This flaw was noted in WEST INDIAN COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 135–
42 (1993). It has been called the “implementation gap.” See Derek O’Brien, 
CARICOM: Regional Integration in a Post-Colonial World, 17 EUR. L.J. 630, 640–42 
(2011). 
 13 CARICOM, CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), 
http://csme.caricom.org/. See also Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the 
Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
(RTC), arts. 1, 78, Feb. 4. 2002, 2259 U.N.T.S. 293, 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/v2259.pdf. 
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well-known report of the West Indian Commission, 
Time For Action, and in several CARICOM reports, 
Community nationals are entitled to assume that the 
purpose of the 2007 Conference Decision is indeed “to 
enhance their sense that they belong to, and can move 
in, the Caribbean Community” and in the context of 
the relevant provisions of the RTC set out in the 
Annex to this judgment, the full extent of the right is 
that both entry and stay of a Community national in 
another Member State must not only be “definite” but 
also “hassle[-]free” or “without harassment or the 
imposition of impediments”. These are essential 
elements of the right.14 
Addressing the free movement of persons has revived a key 
integration issue that frustrated the establishment of the West Indies 
Federation and also presented the CCJ with a problematic 
steppingstone in the Caribbean regional integration process. As a 
Caribbean Policy Development Centre Paper observed “[t]he 
importance of free movement to the CSME project is heavily rooted 
in an understanding of what a Single Market is and what components 
are necessary for it to function effectively.”15 This paper also explained 
that: 
In the wider context, freedom of movement is 
associated with the right of members of a “formal” 
regional community (such as CARICOM) to settle and 
work in any member state of that community. In the 
Caribbean context, however, the term “freedom of 
movement” has been associated with the less 
ambitious objective that is commonly referred to as 
“hassle[-]free travel.”16 
                                               
 14 Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 63. 
 15 Peter W. Wickham et al., Freedom of Movement: The Cornerstone of the Caribbean 
Single Market and Economy (CSME), CARIBBEAN POL’Y DEV. CTR. 15 (2004) 
(explaining the development of freedom of movement within CARICOM from 1989 
to 2004). 
 16 Id. at 18. 
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Even with this association, much of the discussion on freedom 
of movement within CARICOM has focused primarily on achieving 
freedom of movement for skilled workers within the CSME, while the 
basic issue of hassle-free travel has taken a secondary position. As with 
many aspects of the CSME framework, the creation of freedom of 
movement mechanisms based on regional, or supranational law 
remains problematic due to the perceived infringement on the 
domestic sovereignty of CARICOM nations. Moreover, the ability of 
the CCJ17 to resolve these issues by interpreting and proclaiming 
regional law allows for the CCJ’s implementation of the RTC. 
However, those powers also place the CCJ in the crosshairs of legal 
debates that impact notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Further, while the resolution of these issues further advances the 
RTC’s goals, the fallout from ongoing tensions can be highly 
problematic for the expansion of the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction in the 
region. 
Since its publication in 2013, Myrie v. Barbados has become the 
seminal case for hassle-free freedom of movement in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.18 This case is highly significant because it 
considers the question of freedom of movement within the larger 
context of regional integration. In so doing, it exposes the complexities 
of operationalizing the CSME while overcoming the legal and historic 
insular barriers to regional integration. At the regional level, the Myrie 
ruling obviates the need for nations to conform their national travel 
and immigration laws to the RTC. Rather than requiring the 
implementation of national legislation, the CCJ’s decision 
operationalized Article 45 of the RTC by using the treaty’s own 
mechanisms. The key to implementing regional law was the CCJ’s 
reliance on the 2007 Heads of Government Conference Decision 
concerning the implementation of Article 45. Creating a legal 
framework for freedom of movement for CARICOM nationals is 
more difficult when the reason for movement is other than the 
employment of skilled labor. Like the CSME framework for 
establishing work permits, a cooperative strategy for establishing 
                                               
 17 Under Article 211 of the RTC, the Caribbean Court of Justice has 
“compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning 
the interpretation and application” of the RTC. RTC, supra note 13, art. 211. 
 18 Myrie, supra note 1. 
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hassle-free travel serves to fortify the economic alliances of the CSME. 
Yet, the political impediments to establishing hassle-free travel have 
also hindered regional economic integration.19 Thus, at a crucial 
juncture in operationalizing the CSME, the CCJ employed its original 
jurisdiction authority to implement the hassle-free travel provisions of 
the RTC. 
This article explores the development of the right of freedom 
of movement in two main parts. First, it examines the history of 
freedom of movement within the context of regional integration 
starting with the West Indies Federation. Second, the article 
extensively examines the Myrie v. Barbados case to explore how the CCJ 
has interpreted Community law to implement hassle-free travel within 
CARICOM. In so doing, this paper studies the evolution and 
implementation of the right of freedom of movement in CARICOM. 
II. REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 
AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN 
Understanding the particular historical importance of the Myrie 
v. Barbados case requires an overview of the progression of freedom of 
movement within the Commonwealth Caribbean. Through the 
evolution of the West Indies Federation into the CSME of 
CARICOM, the advancement of freedom of movement provides 
insights into the Commonwealth Caribbean’s colonial and post-
colonial tensions in establishing sovereign nations while structuring 
regional treaties and institutions. These historical developments 
highlight the political and practical complications of a unified regional 
approach to freedom of movement. 
More importantly, the evolution of freedom of movement 
shows an interplay between several interrelated features of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean for two important reasons. First, British 
imperialism initiated the integration of the region based on colonial 
administrative exigencies rather than regional political self-
governance.20 Second, the creation of this framework within the failed 
                                               
 19 See O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 632. 
 20 Id. 
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West Indies Federation provides the historic backdrop for the ongoing 
tensions attendant to the development of a contemporary regional 
freedom of movement policy. 
A. Freedom of Movement in the Failed West Indies Federation 
The emergent conceptualization of freedom of movement was 
incorporated into the creation, or perhaps more accurately imposition, 
of the West Indies Federation (“WIF” or “Federation”)21. From its 
onset the organization of the WIF was an attempt by Great Britain to 
organize the West Indies into a federated unit for the purpose of 
repackaging its colonial rule into a regional conglomerate.22 The 
purpose of the union was to ease regional administration, but this 
attempted fusion ultimately spurred national independence 
movements in the region due to Great Britain’s attempt to create a 
revamped colonial structure adopted from the Australian and United 
States models.23 This restructuring was particularly ill-timed in that it 
coincided with the coalescing of independence yearnings in the region, 
and indeed throughout much of the British Empire.24 Thus, in the 
wake of World War II when colonial nations were calling for 
independence, this reorganization of the British Caribbean naturally 
encountered obstacles.25 
Prior to the establishment of the WIF, the 1948-49 Report of 
the British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee 
(“SCAC”)26 incorporated freedom of movement into its list of 
                                               
 21 Elisabeth Wallace, The West Indies Federation: Decline and Fall, 17 INT’L J. 
269, 270 (1962). 
 22 See O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 631–32. 
 23 Charles H. Archibald, The Failure of the West Indies Federation, 18 THE 
WORLD TODAY 233, 238 (June 1962). 
 24 O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 635. 
 25 Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Community Law and 
Common Law: The Rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration 
and Post-Colonial Legacies, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2016). 
 26 The SCAC was established after the Montego Bay Conference of 1947. 
The SCAC’s establishment received the approval of British West Indian colonial 
legislatures and consisted of “17 representatives of those legislatures under the 
chairmanship of Sir Hubert Rance.” British Information Services, The British Colonial 
Empire in 1948 (1949) at 8, 
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proposed legislative powers for the Federation.27 According to the 
Report, matters subject to concurrent legislation of the Federation and 
the constituent territories included “[i]mmigration, emigration and 
deportation” and “[m]ovements of persons, alien and other” between 
the territories.28 These subjects were placed under concurrent 
legislative powers because Federal law would consequently prevail over 
inconsistent law in the constituent territories. With this concurrent 
designation, “there [could] be no room for variation” in those subjects 
“which are essential to the existence of the Federation.”29 By its 
inclusion in the concurrent legislative list in two categories, “freedom 
of movement was treated not so much as a perquisite of Federation 
but rather as a prerequisite.”30 
At the same time, however, the SCAC recognized that “in 
some circles there is a demand for full independence, or for self-
government, either in advance of or simultaneously with Federation, 
on the basis of existing political units.”31 The SCAC opined, 
nonetheless, that “the sheer force of circumstances of the modern 
world makes independence on a unit basis a mirage.”32 The SCAC 
further clarified that its rationale for this conclusion was not a 
“reflection on the political capacity, or the public spirit, of the peoples 
of the territories.”33 Rather, the report explained that real political 
independence requires financial stability.34 Accordingly, the report 
asserted that “Federation, and only Federation, affords a reasonable 





 27 British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee (SCAC), 
Report, 1948-49, Col. 255, at 79–80 (UK). The Report included lists of suggested 
exclusive and concurrent legislation. 
 28 Id. at 80. 
 29 Id. at 17, 79. 
 30 K. W. Patchett, English Law in the West Indies: A Conference Report, 12 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 922, 957 (1963). 
 31 SCAC, supra note 27, at 11. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 12–14. 
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prospect of achieving economic stability” and through the Federation, 
“that political independence . . . is our constant object[ive].”35 
However, the WIF’s incorporation of freedom of movement 
posed apparent threats to economic stability. As a result, “[t]he 
Conference on Freedom of Movement was called in order to help 
resolve the difficulties that had arisen in 1953 over the control of 
migration.”36 In particular, Trinidad observed that “the immediate 
granting of freedom of movement would in the existing economic 
circumstances lead to a flood of immigrants swamping the island’s 
prosperity.”37 At the same time, Trinidad recognized that it was illogical 
to envision a federation with barriers to movement.38 Thus, it proposed 
a delay before eliminating all barriers to movement.39 As the Prime 
Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams, later explained: 
The issue of freedom of movement involved the large-
scale migration to Trinidad from the smaller islands, 
frequently illegal. It was sought to link freedom of 
movement of persons with freedom of movement of 
goods. Britain’s approval of the secession of British 
Guiana, which was theoretically a refuge for the 
redundant population of the smaller islands, and the 
suspicion that Britain was beginning to find Caribbean 
                                               
 35 Id. at 14. 
 36 Lloyd Braithwaite, Progress Toward Federation, 1938—1956, 6 SOC. & ECON. 
STUD. 133, 155 (June 1957). One catalyst for the Conference on Freedom of 
Movement was the disagreement over the Federation’s legislative powers expressed 
by the Trinidad and Tobago delegates at the Federation’s Conference held in London 
in April of 1953. During the 1953 conference, the legislative authority for freedom 
of movement between Federation territories was moved from the Federation’s 
Concurrent Legislative List to its Exclusive Legislative List subject to certain 
limitations for health, security, and economic concerns. See Colonial Office, infra note 
41, at 1. 
 37 Charles H. Archibald, The Failure of the West Indies Federation, 18 THE 
WORLD TODAY 233, 238 (June 1962). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
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migrants unwelcome, made the issue a very sensitive 
one in Trinidad and Tobago.40 
The Conference on Freedom of Movement unanimously 
adopted four resolutions regarding the Federation’s legislative 
authority on free movement of persons.41 The first resolution stated 
that the Preamble to the Federal Constitution should reference the 
objective of the Federation to achieve “the greatest possible freedom 
of movement for persons and goods within such Federation.”42 
Nevertheless in response to Trinidad and Tobago’s concerns, Chapter 
III of the 1958 Federal Constitution deferred the implementation of 
freedom of movement of persons with the Federation “until five years 
after the establishment of the Federation.”43 
Three articles in Chapter III delayed implementation of the 
Federation’s mechanisms for the freedom of movement of persons 
between Federation territories.44 Collectively, these provisions sought 
to sunset any Federation territory’s laws concerning freedom of 
movement that were not repealed five years following the coming into 
force of the Federation’s Constitution, or enacted after that five-year 
period. First, article 49 excluded from the requirements for the 
freedom of movement of persons any law related to maintaining public 
health or public security in a Federation territory.45 Second, article 50 
                                               
 40 Eric Williams, A New Federation for the Commonwealth Caribbean, 44 POL. Q 
242, 247 (Jul. -Sept. 1973). 
 41 Colonial Office, Report of the Conference on Movement of Persons 
within a British Caribbean Federation, 1955, Colonial No. 315, at 2–3 (UK). The 
Conference unanimously adopted a total of six resolutions. The first four resolutions 
focused on freedom of movement within the Federation. In particular, the second 
through fourth resolutions removed control over movement of persons within the 
Federation from the Federation’s Exclusive Legislative List and placed that authority 
over interterritorial movement on the Federation’s Concurrent Legislative List. 
However, the Federation’s Exclusive Legislative List preserved control over 
immigration into, and emigration and deportation from the Federation itself. 
 42 Id. at 1. 
 43 Williams, supra note 40 at, 247. 
 44 West Indies (Federation) Order in Council, 1957, SI 1957 No. 1364. This 
order was authorized by the passage of the British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956. 
The West Indies (Federation) Order in Council, 1957 included an annex with the 
WIF Constitution. 
 45 Id. 
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provided for a review and a repeal of any law controlling movement of 
persons after a five-year period. Finally, article 51 prevented any new 
laws enacted from coming into effect after the five-year period if those 
new laws concerned movement of persons.46 These laws could be 
saved from repeal or allowed to come into force if the Federal 
legislature expressed its lack of objection to any such law within the 
prescribed time frames.47 In short, the repeal of laws that controlled 
the movement of persons between Federation territories was self-
executing in that the Federal legislature only needed to act to preserve 
laws controlling movement of persons that did not fall within the 
article 49 exceptions. Through this repeal mechanism, Chapter III of 
the Federation Constitution endeavored to fulfill the Constitution’s 
objective to establish “the greatest possible freedom of movement of 
persons” within the Federation.48 
Apart from Chapter III, the Third Schedule of the 1958 
Constitution included in the Federation’s Exclusive Legislative List 
“[i]mmigration into, and emigration and deportation from, the 
Federation.”49 This provision gave the Federation sole authority to 
legislate on free movement of persons into or out of the Federation 
while Chapter III would effectively prohibit the individual Federation 
states from passing immigration laws affecting movement between 
Federation territories after the expiration of the five-year period in 
article 50. As one author noted, however, the repeal procedure of 
article 50 “was never invoked nor did the Federal legislature find time 
to pass movement legislation on interterritorial movement” and 
similarly, “the Federal legislature never exercised this exclusive power” 
to legislate on this subject.50 
                                               
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. For laws in force at the end of five years, the Federal legislature had 
ninety days to express its lack of objection. For laws enacted after the five-year 
period, the Federal legislature had sixty days to express its lack of objection to permit 
the law to come into force. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at art. 116 (1), The Third Schedule. The Exclusive Legislation List 
meant that only the Federal legislature, and not the territorial legislatures, could act 
on these matters. 
 50 Patchett, supra note 30, at 959. 
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After the inauguration of the Federation in 1958 and with the 
advent of independence, the West Indies Constitutional Conference in 
1961 revised the freedom of movement provisions in the Federation’s 
Constitution. The revised provisions placed interterritorial movement 
of persons within the Federal Government’s exclusive legislative 
power subject to certain limitations for a nine-year period.51 Within 
that time frame, the Federal Government could only exercise its 
“exclusive” power with the concurrence of the individual Federation 
states.52 Moreover, the individual territories in the Federation could not 
legislate increases of or expansions in migration control without the 
Federal Government’s consent.53 However, the operation of these 
provisions was problematic due to their ambiguity: 
It is not clear whether the Federal power was to be 
subject to concurrence at each exercise or whether the 
exclusive power was to be freely exercisable after all 
governments had agreed. Whichever view is taken, it is 
apparent that ground was again given to those who 
feared the consequences of loosened controls.54 
Ultimately, the WIF dissolved soon after the withdrawal of 
Jamaica and then Trinidad and Tobago. Jamaica, the largest nation in 
the WIF, took two important steps that ultimately resulted in its 
withdrawal from the WIF.55 First, a Jamaican delegation in London 
learned from the Colonial Secretary that Jamaica could achieve 
dominion status without the Federation.56 Second, in May 1960, the 
                                               
 51 Report of the West Indies Constitutional Conference, W. I. GAZETTE 5 (June 29, 
1961), https://ufdc.ufl.edu//UF00076857/00200. While Eric Williams of Trinidad 
and Tobago indicated that this nine-year period coincided with the establishment of 
a customs union favored by Jamaica, Norman Manley of Jamaica expressed 
displeasure with connecting free movement of people and free movement of goods. 
Overand R. Padmore, Federation: The Demise of an Idea, 48 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 21, 55 
(Dec. 1999). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Patchett, supra note 30, at 959. 
 55 Hugh W. Springer, Federation in the Caribbean: An Attempt that Failed, in THE 
AFTERMATH OF SOVEREIGNTY: WEST INDIAN PERSPECTIVES 188, 202–3 (David 
Lowenthal & Lambros Comitas eds., 1973). 
 56 Id. at 203. 
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Jamaican government resolved to hold a national referendum on 
whether Jamaica should remain in the WIF.57 The referendum to 
remain in the WIF failed by a vote of forty-six percent in favor of 
remaining to fifty-four percent against continued membership in the 
WIF.58 This failed national referendum resulted in Jamaica’s 
withdrawal even though its Premier, Norman Manley, was once an 
outspoken supporter of the WIF.59 
With Jamaica’s departure, Trinidad and Tobago became the 
largest remaining member in the Federation. As shown in its position 
on freedom of movement, Trinidad and Tobago was concerned that 
its continuing membership in the WIF would result in Trinidad and 
Tobago “bear[ing] the cost of funding the WIF or supporting the 
poorer eastern Caribbean islands.”60 Before withdrawing, however, 
Trinidad and Tobago offered the remaining other eight nations an 
option to join Trinidad and Tobago as a unitary state.61 Instead, the 
remaining eight nations contacted the Colonial Secretary to state their 
intention to form a new federation.62 After the WIF dissolved on May 
31, 1962, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago achieved independence in 
August 1962.63 
B. RTC & CSME: The Regional Integration Development and 
Freedom of Movement 
Shortly after the WIF’s collapse, the Commonwealth 
Caribbean nations embarked on several regional ventures, with each 
arrangement progressively advancing regional integration. Borrowing 
                                               
 57 Id. at 202. 
 58 Id. at 204. 
 59 O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 634. 
 60 Id. at 635. 
 61 Charles H. Archibald, The Failure of the West Indies Federation, 18 THE 
WORLD TODAY 233, 234 (June 1962). 
 62 It was not until 1981 that seven of these remaining eight nations formed 
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. See Dr. C.L. Mitchell, Economic 
Affairs Secretariat, OECS, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF OECS ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS (1992), https://www.oecs.org/en/our-
work/knowledge/library/oecs-economic-union/historical-perspective-of-oecs-
economic-integration-over-the-past-10-years-july-1992-6398bopt-pdf.  
 63 O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 635. 
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heavily from the 1960 European Free Trade Agreement, the first treaty 
for the Caribbean Free Trade Association (“CARIFTA”) was signed 
in December 1965.64 Before this agreement was implemented, the 
Fourth Conferences of the Heads of Government of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean agreed that “Free Trade should be 
introduced with respect to all intra-Commonwealth Caribbean trade 
by 1st May, 1968.”65 Based on this pronouncement, a second 
CARIFTA treaty was signed and came into effect in 1968.66 
CARIFTA created the institutional steppingstone for 
CARICOM and later, for the formation of the Caribbean Single 
Market and Economy. In 1972, the Heads of Government Conference 
of Commonwealth Caribbean Countries agreed to transform 
CARIFTA on its fifth anniversary into CARICOM.67 The Treaty of 
Chaguaramas that established CARICOM came into effect on July 4, 
1973. 
Article 38 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, however, specifically 
excluded from its ambit the free movement of persons within 
                                               
 64 The Dickenson Bay Agreement was signed on December 15, 1965, by the 
Heads of Government of Antigua, Barbados and British Guiana. Richard L. Abbott, 
The Caribbean Free Trade Association, 1 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 1 (June 1969). 
 65 Summary of Conclusions of the Fourth Conference of Heads of 




 66 The second treaty was first signed on May 1, 1968, by the three signatories 
to the first treaty plus Trinidad and Tobago. On July 1, 1968, the following Windward 
and Leeward islands joined: Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. On August 1, 1968, Jamaica and Montserrat 
entered the agreement. Abbott, supra note 64, at 1. 
 67 ”The Seventh Heads of Government Conference of Commonwealth 
Caribbean Countries has agreed that the Caribbean Free Trade Association 
(CARIFTA) will become a Common Market on 1st May, 1973, the fifth Anniversary 
of CARIFTA.” Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of the Seventh Heads of 
Government Conference of Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 9-14 October 
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CARICOM.68 A paper written for the Caribbean Policy Development 
Centre noted that “[t]his article in the CARICOM Treaty (1973) 
effectively set aside initiatives towards greater freedom of movement 
and during this period Caribbean islands only maintained limited 
‘informal’ mechanisms to allow the movement of employees of 
regional institutions such as the UWI and Meteorological Service as 
well as Lawyers.”69 Entitled “Saving in Respect of Movement of 
Persons”, article 38 provided “[n]othing in this Treaty shall be 
construed as requiring, or imposing any obligation on, a Member State 
to grant freedom of movement to persons into its territory whether or 
not such persons are nationals of other Member States of the Common 
Market.”70 
The next major step in regional integration, the creation of the 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy, was announced in the Grand 
Anse Declaration of 1989.71 The Declaration provided, among the 
Common Market objectives, the goal of creating “arrangements by 
January 1991 for the free movement of skilled and professional 
personnel as well as for contract workers on a seasonal or project 
basis.”72 In this declaration, the CARICOM Heads of Government 
also agreed to create the “Independent West Indian Commission for 
Advancing the Goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas.”73 
                                               
 68 Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community (TOC), art. 38, July 4, 1973, 
946 U.N.T.S. 18, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20946/volume-946-I-
13489-English.pdf. 
 69 WICKHAM ET AL., supra note 15, at 9. 
 70 TOC, supra note 68. 
 71 Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of 
the Integration Movement (Grand Anse Declaration), July 1989, Grand Anse, 
Grenada, https://caricom.org/grand-anse-declaration-and-work-programme-for-
the-advancement-of-the-integration-movement-july-1989-grand-anse-grenada/. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. Annex II contained a resolution that provided “that no later than 1 
October 1989, the Commission be established as an Independent West Indian 
Commission for Advancing the Goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas and report to 
Heads of Government prior to their meeting in 1992” and named Sir Shridath 
Ramphal, as the chairman of the commission. 
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Following the declaration, the WIC Report, published in 1992, 
dedicated a portion of its discussion to “Ease of Travel and Freedom 
of Movement.”74 Based on a Progress Report from the WIC, the Heads 
of Government at their July 1991 meeting agreed “to the immediate 
commencement of efforts to advance action by the Community” in six 
areas recommended by the WIC.75 The first two areas identified for 
action were (1) “[t]ravelling in the [r]egion” and (2) “[f]ree [m]ovement 
of skilled persons.”76 In so doing, the WIC created a bifurcation of the 
freedom of movement concept within CARICOM. 
This noted partition of freedom of movement into two 
components – one for tourists and visitors and the other for skilled 
laborers was an important, yet problematic evolutionary step for 
freedom of movement in the region. The summary of the Progress 
Report explained that the first recommendation would “[p]ermit West 
Indians to travel in their Region with the freedom and ease due to them 
as citizens of a nation common to all [sic] and encourage exchange 
visits, especially among young people.”77 Similarly, the second 
recommendation on skilled labor would “[a]llow West Indian 
graduates of UWI (and other institutions to be identified) and media 
people to work and live freely anywhere in the Region as a first step to 
permitting the free movement of skilled people within the Region.”78 
Article 45 of the RTC states that “Member States commit 
themselves to the goal of freedom of movement of their nationals 
within the Community.”79 By its wording, this provision appears to be 
aspirational rather than binding.80 This wording, however, reflects the 
sentiment of the WIC, which noted that free movement of persons, 
though aspirational, was integral to deepening regional integration.81 
                                               
 74 WIC, supra note 5, at 133–42. 
 75 Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of the Twelfth Meeting of the 
Conference of Heads of Government, 2-4 July 1991, Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
https://caricom.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-twelfth-
meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government/. 
 76 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 71. 
 77 WIC, supra note 5, at 14. 
 78 Id. 
 79 RTC, supra note 13, art. 45. 
 80 Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 58. 
 81 WIC, supra note 5, at 141. 
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For those reasons, the report recommended “the earliest 
implementation” of mechanisms to ensure “‘hassle[-]free’ travel for 
West Indians within the Region.”82 Thus, while noting the need for 
freedom of movement, the WIC also perceived that there was an 
implementation gap for ensuring this freedom.83 Accordingly, the 
report concluded that the implementation of its recommendations on 
freedom of movement would be “an essential pillar for the 
establishment of the Single Market and Economy.”84 Yet, the report 
recognized the practical difficulties of achieving hassle-free travel 
stating: 
Commissions, even Heads of Government, may 
propose but civil servants in the end dispose. This is a 
universal truth which the existing decision-making 
machinery in CARICOM does not fully accommodate. 
An imperial ukase to introduce hassle-free travel, for 
instance, will not yield results at the Immigration and 
Customs barriers unless the employees of Immigration 
and Customs departments from top to bottom are not 
only instructed, but are enlisted in the cause over a 
sustained period of time. We are convinced that this is 
a fundamental truth which will have applications to 
every single recommendation we make in this Report.85 
III. MYRIE V. BARBADOS – A CASE ILLUSTRATING THE ANTITHESIS 
OF HASSLE-FREE TRAVEL 
This discerning observation by the WIC seems to presage the 
case of Myrie v. Barbados.86 After Ms. Myrie’s filing of the initial 
application on May 17, 2012, the extensive proceedings for this case 
took place over a year and a half and ended with the Court’s decision 
on October 4, 2013.87 As a preliminary matter, the Court granted leave 
                                               
 82 WIC, supra note 5, at 142. 
 83 Id. at 141. 
 84 Id. at 142. 
 85 Id. at 15–16. 
 86 Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 1. 
 87 Id. 
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to establish its jurisdiction in hearing this case.88 After settling the 
matter of its original jurisdiction to interpret the RTC, the Court 
functioned as a trial court in hearing the case.89 Accordingly, the Court 
convened several case management conferences, received numerous 
written submissions, held public hearings and visited Grantley Adams 
International Airport (“GAIA”) in Barbados.90 
The primary issue in this case dealt with the freedom of 
movement within the Caribbean Community.91 Unfortunately, the 
facts of this case horrifically illustrate the antithesis of hassle-free 
intraregional travel. As noted at the beginning of this article, the Court 
sympathetically explained: 
First and foremost, however, this is a case about a 
young Jamaican woman who one day left her country, 
for the very first time, in order to travel to another 
Caribbean country and, having arrived there, found 
herself in a situation from which, several months later, 
according to Jamaican medical practitioners, she was 
still suffering post-traumatic stress.92 
Fourteen months after Ms. Myrie was denied entry to 
Barbados, her lawyer filed an application in the Court that also 
permitted the State of Jamaica to intervene. As the Court summarized: 
Ms. Myrie instituted these proceedings against the State 
of Barbados, the Defendant. She claims a right to free 
movement within the Caribbean Community. She also 
claims that the treatment to which she was subjected 
by border officials in Barbados amounts to a serious 
                                               
 88  Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 7. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. The opening paragraph of the decision lists the extensive proceedings 
of the Court. There were four case management conferences, including the 
preliminary one, two pre-hearing reviews, and nine days of public hearings. 
Moreover, the decision listed thirteen attorneys of record—two for the Claimant, 
Ms. Myrie, five for the Defendant, Barbados, three for the Intervener, Jamaica, and 
three for CARICOM. 
 91 Id.  at ¶ 1. 
 92 Id. 
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violation of this right. She characterises the body cavity 
search as an assault, a rape, of such a serious character 
that it constitutes a violation of her fundamental 
human rights and freedoms for which the State of 
Barbados must be held accountable. Ms. Myrie further 
submits that she was singled out and treated in the way 
that she was because of her Jamaican nationality and 
that the treatment meted out to her was less favourable 
than treatment reserved for nationals of other States.93 
A. The Undisputed Story – The Denial of Entry, Detention and 
Deportation of Shanique Myrie 
The facts of Ms. Myrie’s case are extensive. These facts bear 
review here because their iteration humanizes the right to freedom of 
movement. Above all, this extraordinary set of events undergone by 
an ordinary human being highlights the urgency of establishing the 
parameters of free movement rights. In repeating the details of her 
case, we are reminded that legal rights involve human stories and that 
the guarding of those rights guards our very humanity. Unfortunately, 
the horrendous experiences of a young woman on her first trip 
overseas illuminated the pressing need to close the implementation gap 
for hassle-free travel under the RTC. 
On Monday, March 24, 2011, Shanique Myrie, a then twenty-
two-year-old Jamaican woman, landed in Barbados on a scattered 
clouded day.94 At 4:30 p.m., Ms. Myrie disembarked from an inbound 
Caribbean Airlines flight that had originated in Jamaica. Three minutes 
later she had arrived in the Arrivals Hall at GAIA. Ms. Myrie then 
proceeded to Booth 12 where she handed Officer Alicia Young her 
Jamaican passport. Officer Young questioned Ms. Myrie about the 
circumstances and purposes of her visit. Ms. Myrie “answered that this 
was her first visit to Barbados, that she had come for a short vacation 
of two weeks, that she had US$300.00 cash with her, and that she 
                                               
 93 Myrie, supra note 1,  at ¶ 3. 
 94 Id. at ¶ 14. For the weather report, see Past Weather in Bridgetown, Barbados 
— March 2011, timeanddate.com, 
https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/barbados/bridgetown/historic?month=3
&year=2011. 
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would be staying with Ms. Pamela Clarke, whom she had met ‘through 
the internet’”.95 
Apparently, the fact that Ms. Myrie met her intended host 
through the internet compelled Officer Young to submit Ms. Myrie to 
a second inspection.96 At 4:38 p.m., Officer Young took Ms. Myrie to 
a waiting room across from the main entrance to the “Secure 
Immigration Area (“SIA”).”97 Officer Young then entered the SIA to 
go to the office of Mr. Merlo Reid, her supervisor. She “handed him 
Ms. Myrie’s passport and Immigration Arrival Form with the request 
that he personally interview Ms. Myrie.”98 
While Ms. Myrie waited, Officer Young returned to her station, 
but Mr. Reid did not immediately interview Ms. Myrie.99 Before Mr. 
Reid spoke to Ms. Myrie, Police Officer Everton Gittens, who was 
dressed in plain clothes, told Mr. Reid he wanted to interview Ms. 
Myrie after Mr. Reid completed the second inspection.100 During Ms. 
Myrie’s second inspection, Ms. Myrie provided Mr. Reid with the same 
responses that she had given Officer Young. She also gave him Ms. 
Clarke’s phone number. After this interview, Mr. Reid “found no cause 
to deny her entry into Barbados”101 and stamped Ms. Myrie’s passport 
to grant her a thirty-day stay.102 Ms. Myrie momentarily returned to the 
waiting room.103 Mr. Reid returned to his office after informing Officer 
Gittens that Myrie’s inspection was completed. 
Around 5:11 p.m., Officer Gittens, accompanied by a plain-
clothed policewoman, Officer Sirphene Carrington, took Ms. Myrie 
upstairs from the SIA to the Drugs Squad Office of the Royal 
Barbados Police Force (“DSO”).104 The officers then began 
                                               
 95 Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 16. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16. 
 98 Id. at ¶ 16. 
 99 Id. at ¶ 17. 
 100 Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16. 
 101 Id. at ¶ 17. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at ¶ 18. The Court estimated this time by noting Officer Gittens and 
Carrington’s absence from video footage in the SIA and Arrivals Hall of GAIA. 
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interviewing Ms. Myrie “to ascertain whether she was a possible drug 
courier.”105 About twenty minutes later, at 5:33 p.m., the officers 
escorted Ms. Myrie to the Luggage Hall for her suitcase and then to 
the Customs Area for examination by Customs Officers. At the 
Customs Examination desk, Ms. Myrie’s possessions were searched 
from 5:35 to 5:43 p.m.106 
During this time, Officer Gittens twice left the Customs Area 
to enter the Public Arrivals Area.107 Using the number that Ms. Myrie 
provided, Officer Gittens called Ms. Pamela Clarke by cell phone.108 
He identified himself to Ms. Clarke as a police officer in the Drugs 
Squad. He then informed Ms. Clarke of the Drug Squad’s interview 
with Ms. Myrie and asked Ms. Clarke if she knew Ms. Myrie. Ms. Clarke 
denied knowing Ms. Myrie and explained that she was helping her 
friend, Daniel Forde, and that Mr. Forde was at the airport to meet 
Ms. Myrie.109 Prompted by Officer Gittens, Ms. Clarke described Mr. 
Forde’s clothing.110 Officer Gittens then left the Customs Area to 
locate Mr. Forde. Initially, he could not find Mr. Forde. Officer Gittens 
then returned to the Customs Area and called Ms. Clarke once again 
to verify her description.111 Officer Gittens then went outside once 
more to the Public Arrivals area and called out the name “Daniel 
Forde.”112 Mr. Forde approached Officer Gittens and confirmed that 
he was there to give a ride to Ms. Myrie.113 
After this brief conversation, Officer Gittens went back to the 
Customs Area. Around 5:45 p.m., once the Customs Officer found 
nothing illegal in Ms. Myrie’s luggage, Officers Gittens and Carrington 
then took Ms. Myrie back to the SIA waiting area.114 Afterwards, 
Officer Gittens told Mr. Reid that he had interviewed Ms. Myrie and 
                                               
 105 Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 18. 
 106 Id.  at ¶ 14. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at ¶ 19. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
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 113 Id. (Mr. Forde also explained that Ms. Clarke was unable to come to the 
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concluded that she was not truthful about visiting Ms. Clarke and that 
Ms. Myrie intended to stay with Mr. Forde.115 Mr. Reid called Ms. 
Clarke and asked her if she regularly cleared people at the airport. Ms. 
Clarke replied that it was her first time doing so and that “she was 
doing a favour [sic] for a friend” and she then expressed regret for her 
actions.116 
Following this conversation, Officer Gittens departed, and Mr. 
Reid retrieved Ms. Myrie from the waiting area and brought her to his 
office.117 There, Mr. Reid explained to Ms. Myrie that she would be 
denied entry to Barbados. He placed a cancellation stamp on her 
passport and signed it.118 In Barbados’s “register of persons refused 
entry”, the reason for Ms. Myrie’s denial of entry was listed as 
“[i]mproper representation.”119 The official explanation for the denial 
stated that Ms. Clarke “was fronting” for Mr. Forde.120 Mr. Reid then 
requested that an Immigration Officer, Saritta Chadderton, take Ms. 
Myrie and another detained female passenger, Ms. Rickreisha “Susan” 
Rowe, to the Customs Area for another search of her luggage.121 
Subsequent to this final search, Ms. Myrie and Ms. Rowe were 
led to a detention cell in the SIA. The cell was small, cold, and 
windowless. It consisted of one narrow bed, a toilet and sink. Both 
women were detained for the night in these austere accommodations. 
Neither detainee was allowed to take her luggage or cell phone into the 
                                               
 115 Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 21. 
 116 Id.  
 117 Id. at ¶ 22. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at ¶ 23. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at ¶ 22. Ms. Rowe was in detention when Ms. Myrie arrived. Later she 
testified about Ms. Myrie’s demeanor in detention. She observed that Ms. Myrie was 
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https://www.stabroeknews.com/2011/03/27/news/guyana/shanique-myrie-
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cell. In the morning, they recovered their luggage and were taken to 
their flight accompanied by three female immigration officers in a 
manner that made it clear to “onlookers that they were being 
deported.”122 
B. Ms. Myrie’s Own Story 
As noted above, Ms. Myrie testified that she was taken twice 
to the DSO by two people fitting the description of Officers Gittens 
and Carrington.123 She stated that Officer Gittens questioned her 
aggressively and told her that he suspected she was bringing drugs into 
Barbados. She told Officer Gittens that her bags had been searched to 
establish that she had not been carrying any drugs.124 The officers then 
carried her suitcase upstairs and searched it again.125 They opened the 
suitcase bottom and asked about some food items that she had 
packed.126 Officer Gittens also took her slippers from the suitcase, cut 
them in half, sniffed them for drugs and threw them back in her 
suitcase.127 
The officers questioned Ms. Myrie about Ms. Clarke and Mr. 
Forde.128 After Officer Gittens spoke to Ms. Clarke, he told Ms. Myrie 
that “Daniel” was waiting for her and that he knew her name and 
described her clothing.129 Ms. Myrie denied knowing Daniel Forde.130 
When Officer Gittens questioned how Mr. Forde knew these details 
about her, Ms. Myrie said Ms. Clarke must have told him.131 During 
this questioning, Ms. Myrie was frequently accused of lying and 
claimed that Officer Carrington “repeatedly uttered slurs and 
expletives like ‘I hate these f------ Jamaicans,’ ‘You Jamaicans are all 
                                               
 122 Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 24. 
 123 Id. at ¶ 28. 
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liars’ or ‘they only come here to steal our men and carry drugs into our 
country.’”132 
Officer Gittens told Ms. Myrie that they planned to transport 
her to the hospital for a body search and made a call to make those 
arrangements.133 However, after a conversation between the two 
officers, the female officer, Officer Carrington, took Ms. Myrie to a 
bathroom across the hall from the DSO.134 Officer Carrington then 
locked the bathroom door and told Ms. Myrie to take off her clothes.135 
When Ms. Myrie asked why she needed to disrobe, Officer Carrington 
threatened to imprison her if she did not comply with the request.136 
Reluctantly, Ms. Myrie complied with the request. Officer Carrington 
put on a pair of gloves and conducted a painful, humiliating body 
cavity search on Ms. Myrie. As a result of this search, Ms. Myrie 
testified that “she cried and felt ashamed, dirty and angry” and “she 
felt she had been treated like a criminal.”137 
When Ms. Myrie returned to the DSO with Officer Carrington, 
Officer Gittens had Ms. Myrie’s passport in hand and told her he was 
going to have her stamped entry cancelled if she did not tell the truth 
about what she was carrying for Mr. Forde and who Mr. Forde was.138 
Ms. Myrie repeated to Officer Gittens that she did not know Mr. 
Forde. After she confirmed she was “sticking to that story,” Officer 
Carrington told her “You are a liar, I don’t like you f------ Jamaicans, 
you are all liars, you think you’re going to come here and f--- up my 
country, it’s not going to happen.”139 
During her questioning, Ms. Myrie “was refused permission to 
make a phone call to her family in Jamaica” and was denied the 
opportunity to contact the Jamaican embassy.140 Officer Gittens told 
her that she would be released if she told the truth and Ms. Myrie 
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reiterated that she had been telling the truth.141 After her questioning 
ended, Ms. Myrie never saw the two police officers again.142 
Ms. Myrie also provided testimony about the physical 
condition of the detention cell at GAIA. The floors of the cell and 
bathroom were muddy.143 The walls of the cell were covered with 
brown marks that resembled feces. The room was littered with spoiled 
toilet paper and smelled of feces.144 
C. Barbados’s Summation of the Ms. Myrie’s Ordeal 
Barbados’s version of Ms. Myrie’s ordeal emphatically disputed 
her testimony. Both Officers Gittens and Carrington gave signed 
statements for an internal police investigation and testified in Court.145 
In their testimony, the officers stated a number of facts that were 
clearly contrary to Ms. Myrie’s version of events. First, the officers 
indicated that Ms. Myrie was continuously supervised. They also stated 
that Ms. Myrie was not suspected of, not questioned about, and never 
told that she was suspected of transporting drugs. The officers further 
testified that Ms. Myrie was only questioned to determine whether she 
was carrying drugs. The officers likewise denied that Ms. Myrie’s 
luggage was searched, her slippers were cut, and her cell phone was 
examined. Finally, they similarly disavowed that they had insulted Ms. 
Myrie for being Jamaican and that they subjected her to a cavity 
search.146 Thus, Barbados’s account of Ms. Myrie’s ordeal was devoid 
of undue suspicion and mistreatment on its part. 
Accordingly, Barbados denied Ms. Myrie’s factual allegations 
as a basis for denying her claim. In its denial, “Barbados accept[ed] that 
Ms. Myrie was refused entry, detained overnight and deported the 
morning after her arrival[,]” but denied many of her other factual 
allegations. Specifically, based on the officers’ statements, Barbados 
denied that Ms. Myrie was subjected to a body cavity search or was 
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treated improperly, badly or unfavorably. Further, Barbados refuted 
her assertion that she was refused entry due to her nationality and 
claimed that Barbados’s denial of entry resulted from Ms. Myrie not 
being truthful in her statements to immigration officers in Barbados.147 
D. The Court’s Determination of the Facts 
The Court found most of the facts given by Ms. Myrie to be 
credible.148 The Court also noted that after being deported back to 
Jamaica, Ms. Myrie called her friend, Julian Jackson, who had driven 
her to the airport on the day before.149 When she met him at the airport 
upon her return, she started crying and told Mr. Jackson about her 
treatment in Barbados including the slurs about being Jamaican, calling 
her a liar, accusing her of carrying drugs and subjecting her to a body 
cavity search.150 Mr. Jackson immediately drove Ms. Myrie to “the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade where she made an oral 
report to the officials who advised her to put her complaint in 
writing.”151 She followed this advice and submitted a report that 
conformed to her testimony in Court. In response, the Jamaican 
Government sent a delegation to Barbados in an effort to investigate 
the incident.152 
In addition, the Court remarked that two doctors testified to 
the Court about Ms. Myrie enduring psychological and emotional 
injuries as a result of the incident in Barbados. A medical doctor 
concluded that Ms. Myrie suffered from “mild post-traumatic stress 
syndrome” and that this condition arose out of her experience in 
Barbados.153 Further, a forensic psychiatrist testified that, based on his 
                                               
 147 “This refusal was, in the view of Barbados, justified because its 
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examination of Ms. Myrie, she “was still suffering from mental or 
emotional injuries and would continue to do so for some time.”154 
However, given the differences in testimony concerning 
whether Myrie underwent a body cavity search and was subjected to 
slurs during her questioning, the Court had to ascertain the evidence 
establishing or disproving these events. Although Barbados denied 
that Officer Carrington conducted a body cavity search, the Court 
found that Ms. Myrie’s accurate recall of the bathroom and the small 
Drug Squad office bolstered the credibility of her story. Moreover, Ms. 
Myrie provided identifying details that helped the Court establish that 
the officers involved were in fact Officers Gittens and Carrington.155 
Furthermore, the Court found that the reports of the two officers 
lacked credibility because they were virtually identical given that the 
two officers collaborated on their recollection of the events. 
Specifically, the Court remarked that it was unlikely that two Drug 
Squad Officers did not tell Ms. Myrie that they suspected her of being 
a drug courier or that they did not search her for drugs.156 
E. Ms. Myrie’s Locus Standi 
Before hearing Ms. Myrie’s claims, the Court was first required 
to establish its original jurisdiction over her case.157 Consequently, after 
granting leave to establish its jurisdiction, the Court held its first Special 
Leave hearing, on April 18, 2012, for submissions concerning its 
jurisdiction in the case.158 This hearing was historic in that it served to 
establish the right of a CARICOM national to bring suit in the Court 
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for infringement of the right to freedom of movement under the 
RTC.159 
To resolve this issue, the Court examined the five requirements 
of Article 222 of the RTC concerning locus standi of private entities. To 
establish locus standi, the Court must determine whether: (1) the 
individual bringing suit is a “Person[], natural or juridical, of a 
Contracting Party”;160 (2) that individual directly benefits from a right 
under the RTC; (3) that individual’s enjoyment of that RTC right has 
been prejudiced; (4) the Contracting Party has not brought the claim 
or has agreed to let the affected individual bring the claim; and (5) the 
interest of justice requires that the affected individual be allowed to 
bring the claim.161 
In establishing its jurisdiction, the Court found that Ms. Myrie 
met all of these requirements. It opined that as a Jamaican national, 
Ms. Myrie was a “Person of a Contracting Party” and that she had an 
“arguable” right under the RTC from which she directly benefited and 
her enjoyment of that right had been prejudiced.162 The Court also 
noted that Jamaica had permitted Ms. Myrie to bring the case and that 
the interest of justice required granting Ms. Myrie permission to pursue 
her claim.163 
F. Ms. Myrie’s Right to Freedom of Movement 
Ms. Myrie presented two claims based on her nationality. The 
first was her right to be free from discrimination based on her 
nationality. In this claim, Ms. Myrie alleged that Barbados had violated 
“her rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the RTC to non-discrimination 
on the ground of nationality only and to treatment that is no less 
favourable than that accorded to nationals of other CARICOM States 
                                               
 159 Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Community Law and 
Common Law: The Rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration 
and Post-Colonial Legacies, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 89, 111 (2016). 
 160 “Contracting Party” is defined as a party to the RTC. RTC, supra note 13, 
art. 1. 
 161 Id. at art. 222. 
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or third States.”164 Her second claim raised the issue of freedom of 
movement. She based her claim to the right to freedom of movement 
on Article 45 of the RTC as implemented by “a Decision of the 
Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community 
taken at their Twenty-Eighth Meeting (‘the 2007 Conference 
Decision’).”165 
Barbados tested Ms. Myrie’s second claim by asserting in effect 
that there was an implementation gap in the establishment of the right 
of freedom of movement under Article 45 of the RTC.166 Hence, 
Barbados challenged the legal basis for Ms. Myrie’s assertion of her 
right of freedom of movement under the RTC for four reasons.167 First, 
Barbados argued that the 2007 Conference Decision did not create any 
legally binding rights because it was an agreement and not a decision 
within the meaning of Article 28(1) of the RTC.168 Second, due to a 
reservation by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados opined that the 
Decision lacked the required unanimity under Article 28 (1) and further 
that the Decision had “not been subjected to Barbados’[s] 
constitutional procedures as required under Article 240(1) of the 
RTC.”169 Third, Barbados asserted that if the 2007 Conference 
Decision did create a right of freedom of movement for individuals, 
that constructed right and related allegations of wrongful treatment by 
Barbados border officials are not subject to judicial review under the 
RTC because the exercise of immigration and customs procedures 
constitute “activities” that in accordance with Article 30 of the RTC 
are excluded from the free movement rights under the RTC.170 Fourth, 
Barbados claimed that any right of entry created for Community 
nations is not an absolute or unrestricted right because the 2007 
Conference Decisions recognized “the rights of Member States to 
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refuse undesirable persons entry and to prevent persons from 
becoming a charge on public funds.”171 
With its last two arguments, Barbados challenged Ms. Myrie’s 
allegations of discrimination due to her nationality. In that regard, 
Barbados argued that its officers did not discriminate against Ms. Myrie 
based on her nationality or otherwise and consequently there was no 
violation of the non-discrimination provision in Article 7 of the RTC. 
Barbados also claimed that Ms. Myrie was not treated less favorably 
than nationals of other states and therefore, there was no violation of 
the most favored nation treatment as required by Article 8 of the 
RTC.172 
G. The Court’s Response – Filling the Implementation Gap for 
Hassle-Free Travel 
Filling the implementation gap involved a two-step process for 
the Court. The Court first reviewed the applicable Community law to 
determine whether there was binding law implementing freedom of 
movement in CARICOM. After making that determination, the Court 
needed to explore the impact of Community law on domestic law in 
Barbados in the absence of domestic legislation implementing 
Community law in Barbados. As discussed below, it is the second step 
that is of particular significance in common law nations that espouse  
dualism in applying international law. 
The freedom of movement question in Ms. Myrie’s case was 
based on Article 45 of the RTC and the 2007 Conference Decision, 
both of which were critical to the Court’s determination and bear 
repeating here before reviewing the key portions of the Court’s 
decision. 
Article 45 of the RTC states: “Member States commit 
themselves to the goal of free movement of their nationals within the 
Community.” 
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As reproduced in the Court’s opinion, the 2007 Conference 
Decision provides: 
THE CONFERENCE 
AGREED that all CARICOM nationals should be 
entitled to an automatic stay of six months upon arrival 
in order to enhance their sense that they belong to, and 
can move in the Caribbean Community, subject to the 
rights of Member States to refuse undesirable persons 
entry and to prevent persons from becoming a charge 
on public funds. 
NOTED the reservation entered by Antigua and 
Barbuda in this regard173 
The question raised by these two provisions is whether the 
arguably aspirational language of Article 45 of the RTC was 
implemented by a unanimous decision of the Heads of Government 
as required by Article 28(1) of the RTC. To determine that question, 
the Court needed to address the legal significance of the 2007 
Conference Decision in creating binding Community law 
notwithstanding the reservation by Antigua and Barbuda. 
1. The Relationship Between Community and Domestic Law 
Under the RTC 
In its discussion of the applicable law, the CCJ began by 
distinguishing the impact of the applicable community and domestic 
law on this case.174 Although the Court indicated that the Immigration 
Act and Administrative Acts of Barbados are applicable to the facts, 
the Court would first need to determine whether “Community law” 
also applied to the case.175 Given that the Court has the authority to 
interpret the RTC, the Court’s first determination required it to 
determine whether Article 45 of the RTC had been implemented. At 
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the heart of this discussion was the distinction between the creation of 
binding law at the municipal level and the creation of “binding rights 
and obligations at the Community level.”176 Accordingly, as International 
Court of Justice Judge Patrick Robinson explained 
The dualist dichotomous approach to international 
law, resulting in the possibility that in a dualist country 
a treaty may not be enforceable in its courts, but at the 
international level that country may be in breach of the 
treaty, quite often creates difficulties and a kind of legal 
paradox; nonetheless that paradox and dichotomy 
remain an essential part of the constitutional system of 
dualist countries.177 
Turning to Community law, the Court’s first discussion 
focused on the binding nature of the 2007 Conference Decision. As 
noted above, Barbados raised two key points concerning this decision. 
First, Barbados argued that since the wording of the 2007 Conference 
Decision used the word “agreed” and not “decided”, this statement 
was not a binding decision within the meaning of Article 28(1) of the 
RTC.178 Further, Barbados contended that the reservation by Antigua 
and Barbuda meant that the 2007 Conference Decision was not “an 
affirmative vote of all its members” within the meaning of Article 
28(1). 
The Court succinctly dispensed of these two arguments. First, 
it noted that other CARICOM documents consistently referenced the 
2007 Conference Decision as a decision.179 Thus, it concluded that: “it 
is of no consequence that the 2007 Conference Decision uses the word 
‘agreed’ and not ‘decided’”.180 Second, it explained that the reservation 
did not detract from the unanimity of the decision for three reasons: 
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(1) a reservation was not equivalent to a veto and was therefore not a 
negative vote; (2) Antigua and Barbuda could have intervened in the 
case, if those nations had intended that their reservations rendered the 
2007 Conference Decision to be nonbinding; and (3) “the Conference, 
the CARICOM Secretariat and the various Organs of the Community 
have all regarded and treated the 2007 Conference Decision as valid 
and binding.”181 
Next, the Court addressed the impact of Community law on 
domestic law in Barbados. The court noted that nations “with a dualist 
approach to international law” are typically required to enact municipal 
law to transform treaty law into enforceable domestic law.182 This 
process is reflected in Article 240 of the RTC which provides that “the 
relevant constitutional procedures of the Member States” determine 
the creation of “legally binding rights and obligations for nationals of 
such states.”183 
The Court indicated that in the absence of Community law, 
Barbados would have the right under its Immigration Act to restrict 
the entry of “persons who are not citizens or permanent residents of 
Barbados.”184 The Court further noted that 
The RTC, however, and more particularly the 2007 
Conference Decision brought about a fundamental 
change in the legal landscape of immigration 
throughout the Community. In contradistinction to 
foreigners in general, Community nationals now do 
have a right to enter the territory of Barbados and that 
of other Member States unless they qualify for refusal 
under the two exceptions mentioned above.185 
After making this statement on the supremacy of Community 
law, the Court applied the concept of dualism to its discussion on the 
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impact of domestic law on freedom of movement in CARICOM. The 
Court stated: 
Although it is evident that a State with a dualist 
approach to international law sometimes may need to 
incorporate decisions taken under a treaty and thus 
enact them into municipal law in order to make them 
enforceable at the domestic level, it is inconceivable 
that such a transformation would be necessary in order 
to create binding rights and obligations at the 
Community level.186 
The Court then explained the inapplicability of the Saving 
provision in Article 240 of the RTC requiring that Community law be 
“subject[ed] to the relevant constitutional procedures of the Member 
States before creating legally binding rights and obligations for 
nationals of such States.”187 The Court also clarified that Article 240 
did not impact Community law, but instead dealt with enacting 
domestic laws that will “enable Community nationals to enforce their 
rights at the national level and in the municipal courts.”188 The Court 
reasoned that invalidating Community law due to the failure of a 
CARICOM Member State to implement conforming domestic law 
would essentially return CARICOM to “the pre-2001 voluntary 
system” of regional integration.189 The Court also observed that: “It is 
the obligation of each State, having consented to the creation of a 
Community obligation, to ensure that its domestic law, at least in its 
application, reflects and supports Community law.”190 Moreover, the 
Court maintained that requiring the incorporation of Community law 
into domestic law in order to make that Community law enforceable 
at the regional level leads to an absurdity of logic and “would destroy 
the uniformity, certainty and predictability of Community law” if some 
Member States failed to enact the appropriate legislation.191 
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Thus, the Court explained that the Member States are not 
required to enact legislation to create Community law, but only to give 
“domestic effect” to binding decisions that create Community law.192 
Further, the Court expounded that legislation is not required to give 
domestic effect where Constitutional provisions or existing legislation 
sanction the use of executive or judicial actions to grant domestic 
effect to such decisions.193 Accordingly, “in the absence of any 
indication to the contrary a valid decision of a Community Organ or 
Body taken in fulfilment or furtherance of the RTC or to achieve the 
objectives of the Community is immediately binding at the Community 
level.”194 The Court expanded on this remark by indicating that such 
decisions should include a time frame for implementation, but that 
without those time frames, Member States still have an obligation 
under Article 240(2) to “act expeditiously” to implement decisions of 
a Community Organ or Body.195 
To limit the application of Article 45, Barbados also argued 
that the activities of its immigration and customs officials are not 
subject to judicial review by the Court according to Article 30 of the 
RTC.196 Barbados asserted that, under Article 30(2), the activities of 
these officials were excluded from the operation of Chapter Three of 
the RTC which includes Article 45 on free movement of Nationals. 
According to Barbados, these activities concerned “the exercise of 
governmental authority” because they formed “part of a system of 
national security” or involved “the establishment or maintenance of 
public order.”197 The Court set aside these arguments stating: 
The purpose of Article 30 is to allow Member States as 
part of the exercise of their sovereignty to reserve 
certain public service positions strictly for their own 
nationals. . . . It is, however, not intended to limit the 
right to free movement as such nor can it be invoked 
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to prevent the Court from subjecting to judicial 
scrutiny the actions of functionaries in those areas in 
the exercise of their duties in the context of the RTC.198 
2. Unrestricted Right of Entry Under Articles 45 and 46 of the 
RTC 
Following its discussion of judicial review, the Court addressed 
Barbados’s arguments that Ms. Myrie had a restricted right of entry 
under the RTC and that Barbados was justified in refusing her entry. 
The Court disagreed with this argument and stated “[a]lthough Article 
45 RTC embodies that concept in aspirational terms, the right [to free 
movement of Nationals] has to a great extent already been enshrined 
and fleshed out in the RTC itself.”199 To address this issue, the Court 
examined the provisions of Article 46 of the RTC on the “Movement 
of Skilled Community Nationals.” This RTC article was “undertake[n] 
as a first step towards achieving the goal set out in Article 45.”200 To 
reach that goal, Article 46(2) requires that “Member States . . . establish 
appropriate legislative, administrative and procedural arrangements to 
. . . provide for movement of Community nationals into and within 
their jurisdictions without harassment or the imposition of 
impediments.”201 Rejecting Barbados’s arguments the Court declared: 
From Article 46(3) RTC it can be deduced that the 
concept of free movement entails the right of 
Community nationals to have unrestricted access to, 
and movement within, the jurisdictions of the Member 
States “subject to such conditions as the public interest 
may require.” The fourth paragraph of Article 46 RTC 
charges the Conference, inter alia, with the duty “to 
enlarge, as appropriate, the classes of persons entitled 
to move and work freely in the Community.”202 
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Along these lines, the Court’s discussion of freedom of 
movement went beyond the objections raised by Barbados. To bolster 
its opinion, the Court also addressed the need for unrestricted travel 
in order for CARICOM Nationals to provide the services envisioned 
in the CSME. The Court explained that in certain approved service 
sectors under the RTC, Community Nationals should not only have 
the right to unrestricted permission to enter other Members States for 
business purposes, but Nationals should also have a corollary right to 
enter other Members States to receive those services “without being 
obstructed by unreasonable restrictions.”203 In the Court’s view, free 
movement of persons is critical to the provision and use of services by 
Community Nationals. 
3. The 2007 Conference Decision and Freedom of Movement 
under the RTC 
The Court next explored the implications of the 2007 
Conference Decision on freedom of movement under the RTC. The 
Court opened by noting that the decision conferred an “automatic 
stay” or “definite stay” of up to six months for Nationals upon entry 
into a Member State.204 Noting the historical importance of hassle-free 
travel, the Court acknowledged that “the full extent of the right is that 
both entry and stay of a Community national in another Member State 
must not only be ‘definite’ but also ‘hassle[-]free’ or ‘without 
harassment or the imposition of impediments’”.205 
The Court further studied the impact of the stated exceptions 
to this right – undesirability and potential to become a charge on public 
funds—on the right of a definite stay. While Barbados contended that 
the determination of these exceptions was a condition precedent to the 
right of entry, the Court disagreed stating “[t]he wording of the 
Decision where it speaks about ‘automatic stay’ or ‘definite entry’ upon 
arrival, suggests that the right does not depend on discretionary 
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evaluations of immigration officers or other authorities at the port of 
entry.”206 
The Court explained that this conclusion is based upon the 
integration of the 2007 Conference Decision with the RTC’s freedom 
of movement provisions. Hence, the RTC’s security and general 
exceptions in Articles 225 and 226 allows Member States to 
“justifiably” restrict or curtail the right of entry under the RTC as 
implemented by the 2007 Conference Decision. However, these 
permissible limitations in the RTC and the 2007 Conference Decision 
“must equally be construed as exceptions to, and restrictions on, the 
right of Community nationals from other Member States to enter into 
and move around the receiving State ‘without harassment or the 
imposition of impediments.’”207 
To understand the effects of the exceptions to and restrictions 
on freedom of movement in CARICOM, the Court referenced Article 
48 of the EEC Treaty208 and a European Court of Justice case.209 Based 
on this authority, the Court concluded that the exceptions should not 
be considered a condition precedent to the right of entry, but a 
restriction imposed with sufficient evidence of the applicability of the 
exception.210 To illustrate these points, the Court turned to the 
exceptions in the 2007 Conference Decision for undesirable persons 
or persons who may become a charge on public funds and stated that 
there were two consequences of applying these exceptions. First, the 
scope of each exception to the “fundamental principle of freedom of 
movement” and its corresponding rationale “must be interpreted 
narrowly and strictly in order to avoid an unjustified watering down of 
the importance” of the rights constrained by the exceptions.211 Second, 
“being an exception to this fundamental principle, the burden of proof 
                                               
 206 Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 64. 
 207 Id. at ¶ 65. 
 208 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957), 298 
U.N.T.S. 11(the E.E.C. Treaty), available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20298/v298.pdf. 
 209 Case 48/75 Royer, 1976 E.C.R. 498, 512, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61975CJ0048&from=EN. 
 210 Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 66. 
 211 Id. at ¶ 67. 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:2 
576 
must rest on the Member State that seeks to invoke either ground for 
refusing entry.”212 The Court then discussed the procedural 
consequences for a refusal of entry.213 In addition to having adequate 
grounds for refusal of entry, the Member State who denies entry must 
promptly provide the reason for that denial in writing to the affected 
Community National.214 
Having established the fundamental principles of freedom of 
movement, the Court went through the remaining issues in the case 
concerning Ms. Myrie’s claim of discrimination based on her 
nationality and her claim of a breach of the right to Most Favoured 
Nation treatment. Earlier in the decision, the Court had opined that it 
had “no jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of international human 
rights treaties and conventions” and noted that “[t]hose instruments 
generally provide for their own dispute resolution mechanism.”215 
However, the Court recognized that as an international court it was 
authorized under Article 217 of the RTC to “apply such rules of 
international law as may be applicable.”216 As a result, the Court 
concluded that it was able and required to “take into account principles 
of international human rights law when seeking to shape and develop 
relevant Community law.”217 Ultimately, the Court dismissed the 
discrimination claim stating that it was “not possible properly to 
discern a pattern of discrimination” based on the “weaknesses in the 
statistical material and the insufficiency of the other evidence” to 
support this claim.218 For similar reasons, the Court also dismissed Ms. 
Myrie’s claim of breach of Most Favoured Nation treatment.219 Despite 
the dismissal of the last two claims, the Court ordered Barbados to pay 
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Ms. Myrie Bds$2240.00 for pecuniary damages, and Bds$75,000.00 for 
non-pecuniary damages.220 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The choice of the CCJ as the forum for Ms. Myrie’s claim was 
critical to the success of her case. If Ms. Myrie had sued in Barbados, 
the case would have applied the Barbados immigration law instead of 
the RTC.221 By bringing suit in the CCJ to enforce Article 45 of the 
RTC on Movement of Community Nationals, Ms. Myrie invoked the 
original jurisdiction of the CCJ through the application of the RTC.222 
At the same time, the choice of this forum limited Ms. Myrie’s recovery 
to Community law.223 Her resort to the CCJ to assert her freedom of 
movement rights under the RTC sustained her claims in the CCJ even 
though Barbados had not harmonized its domestic laws with 
Community law. Thus, Ms. Myrie’s choice of forum determined the 
outcome of her case. 
This exploration of the historical roots of freedom of 
movement and its development in Myrie v. Barbados indicates two 
important markers in the establishment of freedom of movement. The 
first marker, an attempt to address freedom of movement in the WIF 
constitution, failed in part due to the highly sensitive politics involved 
in freedom of movement. The second marker, a construction of the 
parameters of freedom of movement based on Community law, has 
now enhanced the ability of Caribbean Nationals to secure their 
freedom of movement rights. 
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Notwithstanding this progress, the claimants in three ensuing 
cases on freedom of movement brought subsequent to Myrie v. 
Barbados did not prevail.224 The failure of these cases was not due to a 
change in Community law regarding the right of freedom of 
movement. Instead, the cases failed due to lack of evidence to 
substantiate a claim of breach of freedom of movement rights. 
Nonetheless, Myrie v. Barbados remains a historical watershed in 
the development of Community law and the expanding role of the 
CCJ. As Justice Winston Anderson of the CCJ noted about Myrie: 
It demonstrates the ability of the Court to touch the 
lives of the ordinary Caribbean citizen. It contains 
important guidance not only on the meaning of the 
right to free movement under the RTC but also 
provides a glimpse into the jurisprudential philosophy 
of the Court when sitting in its original jurisdiction. It 
proves that the Court understands its responsibility as 
the guardians of the RTC.225 
Above all, the Myrie v. Barbados case effects a critical closing of 
the implementation gap for hassle-free travel in the Caribbean. The 
case clearly elucidates how, with the CCJ’s astute interpretation, the 
2007 Conference Decision has transformed Article 45 from an 
aspirational goal to an applied fundamental right of freedom of 
movement under the RTC. 
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